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I. INTRODUCTION
In Warren v. Dinter, 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
physician who consulted with a nurse practitioner 2 regarding the nurse
practitioner’s patient had a duty to the patient. The court reasoned that this
duty existed because it was foreseeable that the patient would rely on
information provided to the nurse practitioner by the physician. 3 This
decision was based on one hundred years of medical malpractice precedent
in Minnesota, where courts have consistently held that even if no

*J.D. candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, May 2022. I would like to thank Professor
Mike Steenson for serving as my faculty advisor and providing valuable guidance and
expertise throughout the writing and editing process.
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019).
MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 3 (2019). Nurse practitioners (sometimes abbreviated as
“NP”) are also referred to as “advanced practice registered nurses.” Id.
Nurse practitioner practice includes: (1) health promotion, disease prevention,
health education, and counseling; (2) providing health assessment and screening
activities; (3) diagnosing, treating, and facilitating patients’ management of their
acute and chronic illnesses and diseases; (4) ordering, performing, supervising,
and interpreting diagnostic studies . . . (5) prescribing pharmacologic and
nonpharmacologic therapies; and (6) consulting with, collaborating with, or
referring to other health care providers as warranted by the needs of the patient.
Id. § 148.171, subdiv. 11.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377.
1
2

3
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physician-patient relationship 4 exists, a physician may still have a duty to a
party if it is foreseeable that the party would rely on the physician’s advice
and be harmed. 5 This case note argues that while Warren used a standard
consistent with a century’s worth of jurisprudence in Minnesota, the court’s
application of the standard in Warren was overbroad. Accordingly, Warren
will have significant, lasting, and detrimental implications for medical
professionals and others.
This case note begins with a historical overview of the law relevant to
medical malpractice claims in Minnesota and other states. The history
section also includes a brief chronicle of nurse practitioner practice
authority in Minnesota and an overview of the legal evolution of both nurse
practitioners and physician assistants. 6 Section III provides a summary of
the facts and procedural history of Warren. Finally, Section IV offers an
analysis of several issues created by Warren, including how the decision may
affect certain communications between physicians and their colleagues,
whether the foreseeability of harm standard should be narrowly construed,
and what the medical malpractice implications of Warren may be for
physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. The analysis
explains how Warren could lead to unintended consequences and
confusion among health care providers and other professionals and
provides guidance for mitigating these issues. The section concludes with
potential solutions for health care practitioners and other professionals who
are wary of Warren’s holding.
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
This history section begins with the elements of general negligence,
professional negligence, and medical malpractice claims in Minnesota.
Next, it discusses the history of the use of the foreseeability of harm standard
The term “physician-patient relationship” is used throughout this article. However, the term
may also be used to describe the relationship between patients and health care professionals
who are not physicians, including nurse practitioners (and other nurses), physician assistants,
and other professionals who provide health care services to patients. Likewise, the term
“physician” may be used in this article in the interest of brevity, although, contextually, the
term may imply both physicians and non-physicians, advanced practice providers (like nurse
practitioners), and physician assistants.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377.
Physician assistants (sometimes abbreviated as “PAs”) are discussed in this case note
because they have historically had relationships with physicians—similar to those of nurse
practitioners and physicians—and they often provide the same health care services to patients.
Nurse practitioners and physician assistants are often treated similarly to one another under
state and federal laws, and many of the legal ramifications for nurse practitioners in cases like
Warren will likely impact physician assistants as well. See discussion infra Section II.E.
4

5
6
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in medical malpractice and other professional liability cases in the state. This
is followed by an analysis of other states’ approaches to medical malpractice,
which typically require a physician-patient relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant. A brief history of nurse practitioner practice authority in
Minnesota, both pre- and post-Warren follows. Finally, this section
describes the legal evolution of advanced practice providers like nurse
practitioners and physician assistants.
A. The General Standards for Negligence in Minnesota
In Minnesota, four elements must be met for a showing of general
negligence: (1) the existence of a duty of care by the defendant; (2)
defendant’s breach of that duty; (3) a resulting injury to the plaintiff; and (4)
that defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 7
Slightly different elements may be required in cases related to professional
negligence. For example, in a case related to legal malpractice, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) either
negligent action or breach of contract by the attorney; (3) the attorney’s
negligent action or breach of contract was the proximate cause of damages
incurred by the plaintiff; and (4) but for the attorney’s actions, the plaintiff
would have been successful in his or her claim. 8
A medical malpractice claim in Minnesota has the same elements as
a general negligence claim. 9 While a showing of legal malpractice in
Minnesota requires some kind of relationship to exist between the plaintiff
and the attorney, a showing of medical malpractice does not require the
existence of a physician-patient relationship. 10 Instead, the plaintiff must
show the existence of a duty running from the health care provider to the
plaintiff. 11 This duty arises when it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury
could occur if medical advice is negligently given. 12
Funchess v. Cecil Norman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn. 2001).
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980) (citing Christy
v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293–94 (1970)).
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 375 (citing Molloy v. Meier (Molloy II), 679 N.W.2d 711, 717
(Minn. 2004)).
7
8

9

Id.
Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1,
8 (Minn. 1982)). Warren refers to this case as “Molloy II” to differentiate it from the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Molloy v. Meier (Molloy I), 660 N.W.2d 444
(Minn. App. 2003), also cited in Warren. See Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 375.
Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 325, 173 N.W.
663, 663–64 (1919); Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 686). Relying on Skillings, the Warren court
10
11

12

expanded on Minnesota’s use of foreseeability instead of requiring a physician-patient
relationship and stated that everyone, including professionals like physicians, is “‘responsible
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B. The History of the “Foreseeability of Harm” Standard and Professional

Liability in Minnesota

Minnesota courts have a long tradition of using a “foreseeability of
harm” standard to determine whether a physician has a legal duty of care to
a party in the absence of an established physician-patient relationship. 13 The
use of this standard sets Minnesota apart from the majority of other U.S.
jurisdictions, which base a physician’s duty to a party on the existence of
such a relationship. 14 Minnesota’s jurisprudence in this area may be traced
back to the decision in Skillings v. Allen, where the court held that a
physician treating a child who was hospitalized with scarlet fever owed a duty
to the child’s parents when he advised them it was safe to visit their daughter,
even though she remained contagious. 15 The court reasoned the physician
should have foreseen that the parents would rely on the physician’s
assurance, and as such, he had a duty to act with due care to protect the
parents’ health. 16
Today, Minnesota courts continue to focus on foreseeability of harm
in medical malpractice cases that involve injury to a party who does not have
a physician-patient relationship with the defendant. 17 For instance, in Molloy
v. Meier (Molloy II), the court drew from the holdings in Skillings and other
cases and stated, “A duty arises where it is reasonably foreseeable that [a
party] would be injured” if the defendant were negligent. 18 This decision also
represented the court’s conscious choice to reject any attempts to narrowly
construe the Skillings foreseeability of harm standard, which would cause
Skillings to apply only in cases involving some kind of relationship,

for the direct consequences of [their] negligent acts whenever [they are] placed in such a
position with regard to another that it is obvious that if [they do] not use care in [their] own
conduct [they] will cause injury to that’ third party.” Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 376 (quoting
Skillings, 143 Minn. at 325, 173 N.W. at 663–64).
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 379.
See id. at 377. While many states require a physician-patient relationship as “a necessary
element of malpractice claims,” Minnesota has never held that a physician-patient
relationship is required for a medical malpractice action. Id. at 375.
Skillings, 143 Minn. at 324–25, 173 N.W. at 663.
Id. at 326, 173 N.W. at 664.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 376.
Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719–20 (Minn. 2004). The Molloy II court also drew from
the holding in Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 381, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664 (1959),
which quoted the seminal torts case, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100
(N.Y. 1928) in stating, “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”
13
14

15
16
17
18

694

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

physician-patient or otherwise. 19 Specifically, as noted in the Warren
decision, the court used Molloy II to overturn McElwain v. Van Beek,
which held the foreseeability of harm standard was only relevant when a
contractual relationship existed between the physician and the party. 20
Minnesota’s use of the foreseeability of harm standard in
professional negligence matters extends beyond medical malpractice. 21 For
instance, Minnesota courts have broadly drawn the attorney-client
relationship to create a duty that is “derived from the professional
relationship,” even if no explicit or contractual relationship exists. 22
Specifically, in Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, the court held that
an attorney who completed a consultation with a potential client had a duty
to act with due care in offering legal advice because, even though no
attorney-client relationship had been established, it was foreseeable that the
potential client would rely on the attorney’s advice and be harmed if the
advice was negligently provided. 23 Since the 1919 Skillings decision,
Minnesota courts, on multiple occasions, have approved of the utility of the
foreseeability of harm standard in various legal questions regarding a
professional’s duty to a third party. 24 It should be little surprise, then, that
this once again occurred in Warren. 25
C. Other States’ Use of the Physician-Patient Relationship
While Minnesota does not require the existence of a physicianpatient relationship to establish a health care professional’s duty to a party,
many other states do require such a relationship. 26 However, there are
19

Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377.

McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). As noted by the
court in Warren, the Skillings court held that, even if there were no contractual relationship
between the physician and the patient’s parents, the result would be the same because the
potential harm was foreseeable to the physician. Skillings, 143 Minn. at 327, 173 N.W. at
663. It was this foreseeability that created the duty, not the presence of a contractual
obligation to the parents. Id.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 376.
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 689–90.
See, e.g., id. at 686 (a lawyer’s duty to a potential client); see also Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d
711 (Minn. 2004) (a physician’s duty to a child’s parent).
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 377.
See, e.g., Estate of Kundert ex rel. Kundert v. Ill. Valley Cmty. Hosp., 964 N.E.2d 670,
672 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“In the medical malpractice arena, a ‘physician’s duty arises only
when a clear and direct physician-patient relationship has been established.’” (quoting Siwa
v. Koch, 902 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (Ill. App. 2009))); Roberts v. Sankey, 813 N.E.2d 1195,
1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The duty owed by a physician arises from the physician-patient
relationship.” (citation omitted)); Olson v. Wrenshall, 822 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 2012)
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
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varying approaches for determining when a physician-patient relationship
exists. For instance, many states require a physician-patient relationship to
be consensual on each side, whereby the patient seeks out the physician’s
care and the physician agrees to treat the patient. 27 Several courts have held
that such consent by a physician to treat a patient must be express, meaning
that the physician must take some affirmative action or otherwise knowingly
treat the patient. 28 A few courts have held that a physician-patient
relationship requires a contractual agreement either with the patient 29 or with
the physician’s employer. 30
The situation is less clear when it comes to a physician’s duty to a
third party or a party who is not explicitly the physician’s patient. Several
courts have held that if a physician provides a consulting opinion about a
patient’s care by reviewing x-ray films, lab results, or patient records, an
implied physician-patient relationship is created. 31 This can be true even if
(“A physician’s duty to exercise the applicable standard of care arises out of the physicianpatient relationship.”); Thomas v. Hermoso, 973 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(“Liability for medical malpractice may not be imposed in the absence of a physician-patient
relationship.”); Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 909 (Or. 2012) (“In Oregon, as
in most states, a physician-patient relationship is a necessary predicate to stating a medical
malpractice claim.”); Fay v. Grand Strand Reg’l Med. Ctr., 771 S.E.2d 639, 644 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2015) (“The establishment of a doctor/patient relationship is a prerequisite to a claim
of medical malpractice.”).
Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001) (citing Lopez v. Aziz,
852 S.W.2d 303, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1993)).
Id.; see also Huddle v. Heindel, 821 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (stating that a
physician-patient relationship is consensual when the patient “knowingly seeks the assistance
of the physician and the physician knowingly accepts [her] as a patient”); Kundert, 964
N.E.2d at 675 (explaining that the physician-patient relationship “cannot be established
where a patient does not seek that physician’s medical advice and the physician does not
knowingly accept that person as a patient” (citation omitted)); Thayer, 792 N.E.2d at 925
(providing the three factors that Indiana courts consider to determine whether a consensual
physician-patient relationship exists: (1) whether the physician made a recommendation to
the patient regarding a condition or treatment; (2) whether the physician provided or
participated in the patient’s treatment; and (3) whether the physician acted in such a way that
the patient could infer that a physician-patient relationship had been established).
See Gallardo v. United States, 752 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying Colorado law
in stating a physician’s duty comes from an “express or implied contractual relationship”).
See Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a contractual
relationship between a physician and the physician’s employer could have created a duty in
the physician if the patient had proven that he was the intended beneficiary of the contract).
See, e.g., Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 448 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)
(holding that a physician-patient relationship was implied between a patient and a consulting,
on-call physician when the physician viewed the patient’s lab results and x-ray films because
the physician (1) participated in the patient’s diagnosis; (2) participated in the patient’s
treatment or prescribed a course of treatment for the patient; and (3) owed a duty to the
27

28

29

30

31
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the consulting physician never examined, met, or even knew the name of
the patient. 32
Still, the premise that a physician-patient relationship may exist by
implication is not absolute. There are several instances where courts have
held that certain activities are not enough to constitute an implied physicianpatient relationship—in which case, no duty exists. 33 Such cases often involve
either brief consultations or informal conversations between physicians
rather than formal requests for specific medical advice. These informal
discussions are often referred to as “curbside consultations.” 34
facility, staff, or patient for whom the physician served in an on-call capacity); Thomas, 973
N.Y.S.2d at 346 (finding that a physician-patient relationship is implied “when a physician
gives advice to a patient, even if the advice is communicated through another health care
professional”); Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 593
(Tenn. 2004) (explaining that a physician-patient relationship “may arise out of a consultation
by the patient’s primary physician with another physician when that consultation is for the
treatment of that patient,” with consultation including activities like reviewing patient records
and discussing diagnosis and treatment (citation omitted)).
See, e.g., Mackey v. Sarroca, 35 N.E.3d 631, 637–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (stating that a
physician may have a duty to a patient when there is a “special relationship,” including
instances when the physician is asked by a colleague to take some action on the patient’s
behalf, such as conducting tests or reviewing or interpreting test results, even when the
consulting physician has never seen the patient, so long as the consulting physician has taken
“some affirmative action to participate in the care, evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment of a
specific patient”); Gillespie v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 900 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(providing that a consensual physician-patient relationship may exist when the physician is
contacted by someone acting on the patient’s behalf or when the physician performs services
for the patient—even when the physician did not meet or interact with the patient); Wheeler
v. Yettie Kersting Mem’l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 39–40 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that an
on-call physician who reviewed a patient’s status with a nurse over the phone and provided
a medical decision sought by the nurse established an implied physician-patient relationship
even though the physician did not actually examine the patient).
See, e.g., Pham v. Black, 820 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that a hospitalist
physician who refused to admit a patient after consulting with the patient’s treating physicians
did not have a physician-patient relationship with—or a duty to—the patient because the
physician did not meet the patient or participate in the patient’s diagnosis or treatment);
Harper v. Hippensteel, 994 N.E.2d 1233, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a physician
who was in a collaborative practice agreement with a nurse practitioner such that he reviewed
five percent of her patient records did not have a physician-patient relationship with the nurse
practitioner’s patient even though he was required by law to be available to the nurse
practitioner for consultative purposes); Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) (“A
physician who gives an ‘informal opinion,’ . . . at the request of a treating physician, does not
owe a duty to the patient because no physician-patient relationship is created.”).
Although the decision does not define the term, Irvin is one of a handful of cases that
specifically uses the term “curbside consultation.” Irvin, 31 P.3d at 943. The Irvin court
acknowledged that curbside consultations are “medically important but legally ambiguous”
and noted that courts have been reluctant to extend the traditional physician-patient
32

33

34
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Finally, it is important to note—particularly in light of the fact pattern
and questions raised in Warren—that some courts have acknowledged an
increased emphasis on team-based health care, in which multiple physicians
work together to diagnose and treat a patient. 35 In these cases, courts have
held that a physician-patient relationship may be implied between a
physician and a party, who is not explicitly the physician’s patient, based on
an analysis of multiple factors, including whether the physician in question
took some affirmative action to knowingly participate in the patient’s
diagnosis or treatment. 36
Some legal commentators have suggested that since, in most states,
a physician-patient relationship forms the foundation of a medical
malpractice claim, the manner in which this relationship is established
should be more uniformly defined to better prevent the filing of frivolous
lawsuits. 37 There is currently a lack of consistency in establishing when a
relationship to include these “informal consultations.” Id. The court also found that holding
physicians responsible for information exchanged during curbside consultations would be
contrary to public policy as it would chill efforts to improve patient care through the exchange
of medical knowledge. Id. While the case law does not explore curbside consultations at
length, there are several journal articles that discuss these interactions. These articles (and
their conclusions) are discussed further infra Part IV.
In Mead v. Legacy Health System, the court stated that in today’s health care system, where
physicians work together to provide care to individual patients,
whether a physician’s expression of an opinion constitutes a diagnosis [and has therefore
established a physician-patient relationship with the patient by implication] will vary
depending on, among other things, the customary practice within the relevant medical
community, the degree and the level of formality with which one physician has assumed (or
the other physician has ceded) responsibility for the diagnosis or treatment, the relative
expertise of the two physicians, and the reasonable expectations, if any, of the patient under
the circumstances.
In our view, the standard should not be whether a judge or a jury would classify a statement
as a diagnosis or the provision of treatment. Rather, it should be whether a physician who
has not personally seen a patient either knows or reasonably should know that he or she is
diagnosing a patient’s condition or treating the patient.
283 P.3d 904, 910 (Or. 2012).
Likewise, in Kelley, 133 S.W.3d at 596, the court stated that today’s health care system is
increasingly complex, with several physicians participating in patient diagnosis when they may
not have ever interacted with the patient. As such, it is “simply unrealistic to apply a narrow
definition of the physician-patient relationship in determining whether such a relationship
exists for purposes of a medical malpractice case.” Id. However, unlike the result in Mead,
in Kelley, the court held that a physician-patient relationship could exist between the
consulting physician and the patient. See id. at 598.
Mead, 283 P.3d at 910; see also Kelley, 133 S.W.3d at 596.
See Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the Professional
35

36
37

Standard of Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort
Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L..J. 109, 132 (2010) (stating that a clearer definition
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physician-patient relationship is formed and what factors are relevant for
determining whether such a relationship exists. 38 This inconsistency may
cause medical malpractice claims to be adjudicated based on vague
standards, allowing plaintiffs in states that require a physician-patient
relationship for such claims to essentially bypass this requirement
altogether. 39
However, the case law reviewed in this section shows that it is difficult
to establish precisely when a physician-patient relationship is formed. While
courts appear eager to create a definition for this relationship, no single test
has emerged as the clear favorite. In light of this uncertainty, compelling
arguments have been made for finding a middle ground. 40 In other words,
according to this viewpoint, courts should neither allow a brief phone call
between physicians to create a physician-patient relationship, nor require a
comprehensive physical exam before such a relationship is established. 41
Other commentators have gone further, arguing that a physicianpatient relationship should not be required for a finding of medical
negligence. 42 This argument centers on the idea that, in the modern health
care system, more patients may actually be “nonpatients” who may not be
able to show a physician-patient relationship but have had some interaction
with a physician that has allegedly led to harm. 43 While these “nonpatients”
could arguably still sue a physician for ordinary negligence, the applicable
standard of care (that of a reasonable person versus that of a reasonable
physician in a particular field of medicine) may be less favorable. 44 Under
this argument, removing the requirement of a traditional physician-patient
relationship could allow for relief where it otherwise may be lacking. 45 This
view, which allows for the use of a foreseeability of harm standard, rather
of the elements of a medical malpractice claim, including the physician-patient relationship,
could reduce the costs associated with such claims and decrease “meritless lawsuits”).
Id.; see also Valarie Blake, When Is a Patient-Physician Relationship Established?, 14 AM.
MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 403, 404–05 (2012) (illustrating that the determination of a
physician-patient relationship often depends on the situation and state law).
O’Connor, supra note 37, at 111.
Teresa Baird, Note, Who Is Actually Calling the Shots? Watch Out, They May Not Be
Liable: Irvin v. Smith, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 185, 204 (2003).
38

39
40

Id.
See Patrick D. Blake, Note, Redefining Physicians’ Duties: An Argument for Eliminating
the Physician-Patient Relationship Requirement in Actions for Medical Malpractice, 40 GA.
41
42

L. REV. 573, 612 (2006) (noting that a balancing test based on multiple factors may be more
appropriate than a strict, direct-contact test for determining whether a physician-patient
relationship exists).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576–77.
43
44
45

Id.
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than a required physician-patient relationship, 46 is similar to that used by
Minnesota courts.
D. Nurse Practitioner Practice Authority in Minnesota, Pre- and PostWarren
The events leading to the Warren decision took place at an
interesting time for Minnesota nurse practitioners. In 2014, when Simon
first examined Warren, Simon, like all nurse practitioners in Minnesota,
was required to designate a collaborating physician. 47 Collaborating
physicians and nurse practitioners were expected to enter into “collaborative
management plans,” which set forth the process by which the nurse
practitioner would consult with the physician while still retaining primary
responsibility for the patient’s care. 48 Nurse practitioners were also required
to enter into a written agreement with a physician as a condition of obtaining
the authority to prescribe medications and medical devices. 49
However, in 2015, Minnesota enacted new legislation that removed
both the collaborative plan and prescriptive authority agreement
requirements from the law. 50 This, combined with provisions in the new law
establishing a licensure process for nurse practitioners, resulted in nurse
practitioners gaining full and independent practice authority in the state. 51
E. The Legal Evolution of Advanced Practice Providers

Warren addressed an issue of growing importance in today’s
discussions about health care delivery: the expanding practice authority of
advanced practice providers like nurse practitioners and physician assistants
in many states. Minnesota licenses both nurse practitioners 52 and physician
assistants 53 to provide health care services to patients. Nurse practitioners
are nurses who have completed a master’s or doctorate-level education. 54 In
46

Id. at 599.

47

MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 6 (2014).

48

Id. subdivs. 6–7.

49

MINN. STAT. § 148.235, subdiv. 2 (2014).

50

APRN Scope of Practice Bill Signed and Effective January 1, 2015, MINN. BD. OF NURSING

(May
29,
2014),
https://mn.gov/boards/nursing/resources/news/?id=21-37188
[https://perma.cc/4PTH-YDUD].
51

Id.

MINN. STAT. § 148.211, subdiv. 1(a) (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 147A.02 (2019).
What’s a Nurse Practitioner (NP)?, AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, https://www.
aanp.org/about/all-about-nps/whats-a-nurse-practitioner
[https://perma.cc/Q3DS-2UTV]
(last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
52
53
54
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addition to obtaining state licensure, nurse practitioners are nationally
certified in clinical focus areas that include, among other areas, family
medicine, adult primary care, acute care, pediatrics, psychiatry, and
women’s health. 55 Nurse practitioners commonly practice in hospitals,
clinics, emergency rooms, urgent cares, nursing homes, and other settings. 56
In Minnesota, a nurse practitioner’s scope of practice includes educating
and counseling patients on health care and disease prevention, health
screening, and assessment; diagnosing and treating patient illnesses;
ordering, performing, and interpreting diagnostic tests; and prescribing
medications and medical devices. 57 As of March 2020, there are more than
290,000 nurse practitioners licensed in the United States 58 and more than
9000 licensed in Minnesota. 59
On the other hand, physician assistants are medical providers who
have completed a master’s degree. 60 A handful of doctorate-level
educational programs are also available for physician assistants. 61 Unlike
nurse practitioners, who have a clear path to entering the profession as a
registered nurse, physician assistants often come from varied backgrounds
within other areas of health care, bringing professional experience as
medical assistants, paramedics, athletic trainers, or other patient-facing
providers. 62 Physician assistants practice in hospitals, medical offices,
community health centers, retail clinics, nursing homes, correctional
institutions, and other settings. 63 Physician assistants in Minnesota take
patient histories; perform physical examinations; order and perform
AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, NP FACTS (2020), https://storage.aanp.org/www/
documents/NPFacts__021920.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYD2-HZPY].
AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, supra note 54.
MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 11 (2019).
AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, supra note 55.
MINN. BD. OF NURSING, ANNUAL LICENSURE REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 8 (2019),
https://mn.gov/boards/assets/Annual_Licnsr_Rprt_2019_tcm21-322613.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4JQ-CE8T].
AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, WHAT IS A PA? (2019), https://www.aapa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/What_Is_A_PA_Infographic_LetterSize_Jan2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z96C-9DJY].
See, e.g., Doctor of Medical Science, A.T. STILL UNIV., https://www.atsu.edu/doctor-ofmedical-science [https://perma.cc/3RN6-88A4] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); Doctor of
Medical Science, UNIV. OF LYNCHBURG, https://www.lynchburg.edu/academics/college-ofhealth-sciences/physician-assistant-medicine/doctor-of-medical-science/
[https://perma.cc/KYG3-VKAX] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); Doctor of Medical Science,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN UNIV. OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, https://rm.edu/academics/doctor-ofmedical-science/ [https://perma.cc/NXW9-DD46] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, supra note 60.
55

56
57
58
59

60

61

62
63

Id.
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diagnostic and therapeutic procedures; counsel patients on disease
management and prevention; transmit and execute specific patient orders;
prescribe, administer, and dispense medications; and assist in surgery. 64 As
of March 2020, there are more than 140,000 physician assistants licensed
in the United States 65 and more than 3300 licensed in Minnesota. 66
Nurse practitioners and physician assistants are widely seen as
occupying an important space in health care delivery. 67 This recognition is
increasingly leading to the inclusion of nurse practitioners and physician
assistants in federal and state legislation meant to increase access to health
care services. 68 For instance, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Affordable Care Act) defined “primary care practitioners” as physicians,
nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. 69 Recent federal legislation has
also authorized nurse practitioners and physician assistants to provide
federally regulated, medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder 70
and supervise cardiac and pulmonary rehabilitation programs for Medicare
patients. 71
Similarly, state legislatures are increasingly enacting laws to expand the
roles of these providers. As of 2019, twenty-two states (including Minnesota)
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation authorizing full
MINN. STAT. § 147A.09, subdiv. 2 (2019).
AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, supra note 60.
Licensure Statistics, MINN. BD. OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, https://mn.gov/boards/medicalpractice/consumers/data/stats/ [https://perma.cc/4QT3-RUKS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
See Jacquelyn Corley, Advanced-Practice Providers Are Key to America’s Healthcare
Future,
FORBES:
CAPITAL
FLOWS
(Mar.
16,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/03/16/advanced-practice-providers-are-key-toamericas-healthcare-future/#720911975998 [https://perma.cc/XCF5-JM4P] (explaining that
advanced practice providers “represent a healthcare workforce of certified and state-licensed
medical professionals that are essential to operations in both inpatient and outpatient
settings”).
See Christopher Cheney, More States Pushing for Autonomy in Scope-of-Practice Battle,
HEALTH LEADERS (May 1, 2019), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/clinical-care/morestates-pushing-autonomy-scope-practice-battle
[https://perma.cc/TR8Y-W55G]
(“[A]dvanced practice practitioners have been equally insistent on gaining expanded scope
of practice across the country. For example, in several states, laws that expand scope of
practice for physician assistants (PA), nurse practitioners (NP), and advanced practice
registered nurses (APRN) have already been adopted.”).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 § 5501, 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(x)(2)(A)
(2018).
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 § 303, 21 U.S.C. §
823(g)(2)(G)(iii)(II) (2018).
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 § 51008, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(eee) (2018). This provision is
not effective until January 1, 2024. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123,
§ 51008(c).
64
65
66

67

68

69

70

71
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practice authority for nurse practitioners. 72 This generally means that nurse
practitioners in these jurisdictions are able to diagnose, treat, and manage
patients’ health conditions and prescribe medications without being
required to enter into a career-long supervisory or collaborative agreement
with another health care provider such as a physician. 73
Likewise, states are enacting legislation to reduce regulatory burdens
on physician assistant practice, including removing restrictions on
prescribing medications, allowing practice-level decision-making about
physician assistants’ scope of practice, and removing the statutory
requirement that a physician assistant have a specific relationship with a
physician or other health care professional. 74 In Minnesota, physician
assistants have full prescriptive authority (including Schedule II-V
controlled medications), 75 and many decisions regarding a physician
assistant’s role are made at the practice site. 76 While physician assistants
must have a written practice agreement with a supervising physician, the
physician need not be physically present while the physician assistant is
providing care. In early 2019, legislation to remove additional barriers to
physician assistant practice was introduced in the Minnesota Senate. 77
The move towards increased practice authority for advanced practice
providers is partially due to current and projected physician shortages. For
instance, Minnesota is expected to need more than 1100 additional primary
care physicians by 2030. 78 This is an increase of nearly 30% over the 2010
workforce. 79 Nationwide, it is expected that there will be a shortage of
State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.aanp.org/advocacy/state/state-practice-environment [https://perma.cc/V7KU3BG2].
Id. Some states authorizing full practice authority require nurse practitioners to enter into
a supervisory or collaborative agreement with another health care provider until the nurse
practitioner has attained a certain amount of practice experience. Id. Minnesota requires
nurse practitioners to complete 2080 hours in a collaborative agreement with either a
physician or an experienced nurse practitioner prior to advanced practice licensure. MINN.
STAT. § 148.211, subdiv. 1c (2019).
See The Six Key Elements of a Modern PA Practice Act, AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN
ASSISTANTS (Aug. 2018) (unpublished issue brief) (on file with author); Optimal Team
Practice, AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, https://www.aapa.org/advocacycentral/optimal-team-practice/ [https://perma.cc/UP4A-2LW9] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
MINN. STAT. § 147A.09, subdiv. 2(10) (2019).
Id. subdiv. 1.
S.F. 2043, 91st Sen. Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019).
ROBERT GRAHAM CTR., MINNESOTA: PROJECTING PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE 1 (2013), https://www.graham-center.org/content/dam/rgc/documents/mapsdata-tools/state-collections/workforce-projections/Minnesota.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV29HGJL].
Id. at 2.
72

73

74

75
76
77
78

79
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between 21,000 and 55,000 primary care physicians by 2032. 80 Meanwhile,
the number of nurse practitioners and physician assistants are expected to
nearly double by 2032. 81 As a result, advanced practice providers are
expected to help mitigate the physician shortage.
III. THE WARREN DECISION
A. Factual Background
Susan Warren went to an Essentia Health clinic with a variety of
symptoms, including fever, chills, and abdominal pain. 82 Sherry Simon, a
nurse practitioner, examined Warren. 83 Simon ordered a blood test for
Warren and, upon examining the results, found an elevated white blood cell
count and other atypical markers, which Simon believed were indicative of
an infection requiring hospitalization. 84
Simon wrote a letter for Warren’s employer, documenting Warren’s
illness and stating that Warren would be unable to work. 85 Since the Essentia
health care system did not have a local hospital, Simon contacted the
Fairview Range Medical Center to request Warren’s admission. 86 This
action was consistent with standard practice at Essentia. 87 Simon was

ASSOC. OF AM. MED. COLL., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND:
PROJECTIONS FROM 2017 TO 2032, at viii (2019), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/c/2/312019_update_-_the_complexities_of_physician_supply_and_demand__projections_from_2017-2032.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBV-CW3C].
Id. at 23.
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 377 (Minn. 2019).
80

81
82

Id.
Id.
Id. at 372. The Warren majority used this letter to show that Simon had already reached a
conclusion regarding whether Warren should be hospitalized. Id. at 379. Therefore,
83
84
85

according to the majority, Simon’s conversation with Dinter was not a curbside consultation
in which Simon sought to “pick a colleague’s brain about a diagnosis.” Id. Rather, Simon
called Dinter solely as part of the protocol for requesting patient admission at Simon’s facility.

Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 372–73.
86
87
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connected with one of the three hospitalists, 88 Dr. Richard Dinter, at
Fairview. 89
Simon and Dinter spoke for approximately ten minutes. 90 At trial, they
disagreed on the specifics of the diagnostic information shared by Simon
during this call. 91 They also disagreed about whether Simon requested
Warren to be hospitalized or whether Simon asked Dinter’s opinion
regarding potential hospitalization. 92 However, both agreed that Dinter told
Simon that Warren’s elevated white blood cell count was likely due to
uncontrolled diabetes. 93 They both also agreed that Dinter advised Simon
to “get that issue under control and see Warren the following Monday.” 94
However, Simon claimed Dinter told her Warren did not need to be
hospitalized, while Dinter claimed he responded to Simon’s question with,
“to what end[?]” 95
After her call with Dinter, Simon spoke with her collaborating
physician, 96 Dr. Jan Baldwin, in hopes that Baldwin would be able to assist
Simon with her request to hospitalize Warren. 97 Like Dinter, Baldwin
advised Simon that diabetes could be the cause of Warren’s abnormal
blood test results. 98 Simon informed Warren that she had been advised by
a hospitalist (Dinter) that Warren did not require immediate
hospitalization. 99 Simon discussed the diabetes diagnosis with Warren,
Hospitalists, AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, https://www.aafp.org/practicemanagement/administration/hospitalists.html [https://perma.cc/9NNY-KGVN] (last visited
Sep. 5, 2019). Hospitalists are physicians who primarily provide patient care in a hospital
setting. Id. They often assess a patient’s condition prior to or at the time of admission to a
hospital. Id. A hospital or health care system may employ a hospitalist for the primary
purpose of admitting patients. See Hospital Medicine, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS,
https://www.acponline.org/about-acp/about-internal-medicine/general-internalmedicine/hospital-medicine [https://perma.cc/4T7H-MZH2] (last visited Sep. 5, 2019).
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 372.
Id. at 373.
88

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 148.171, subdiv. 6 (2014). At the time of Warren’s initial visit to Simon,

Simon was subject to Minnesota laws requiring nurse practitioners to have ongoing
“collaborative management” by a physician. Id. This arrangement required nurse
practitioners to establish a relationship with a physician practicing in a similar area of health
care such that the nurse practitioner could consult with the physician as necessary to advance
patient care. Id. subdivs. 6–7.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 373.

97
98
99

Id.
Id.
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prescribed medication, scheduled a follow-up appointment, and released
Warren to her home. 100 Warren was found dead three days later due to
sepsis caused by an untreated staph infection. 101
B. Lower Courts’ Decisions
Warren’s son sued Dinter, claiming Dinter was negligent in telling
Simon that he did not believe Warren needed to be hospitalized. 102 Dinter
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he did not have a duty
to Warren, as Simon had only contacted Dinter due to his role as a
hospitalist, and, therefore, his advice to Simon was a one-time, “professional
courtesy.” 103 Dinter also argued that his actions (or omissions) were not a
proximate cause of Warren’s death. 104
The trial court granted Dinter’s motion for summary judgment on
the duty issue, holding that the phone call between Simon and Dinter was
“an informal conversation between medical colleagues,” which did not
create a physician-patient relationship between Dinter and Warren. 105 The
trial court denied summary judgment on the causation issue, stating that
there was still a remaining question of fact regarding Warren’s cause of
death. 106

100
101

Id.
Id. Justice Anderson expanded on Warren’s recent health history in his dissenting opinion.

When Warren presented to Simon, complaining of “three days of worsening of symptoms
with fevers, chills, abdominal pain, cough, and shortness of breath,” Warren had also
explained to Simon that she had experienced approximately three weeks’ worth of exposure
to welding smoke at her job. Id. at 380–81 (Anderson, J., dissenting). However, Simon told
Dinter that her examination of Warren was “essentially normal” and that Warren did not
have a fever and appeared to be “in no apparent distress.” Id. at 381. Simon had also called
Warren’s employer and poison control and came to the belief (which she expressed to
Dinter) that the welding smoke was “no longer part of the issue.” Id. Simon preliminarily
believed that Warren had an infection, due largely to her high white blood-cell count. Id.
However, Simon also found that Warren’s blood sugar was high, and her sodium was low.
Id. Simon told Dinter that Warren’s case was “confusing” because her chief complaint was
smoke inhalation, yet she had myriad other symptoms, including some that Simon did not
mention to Dinter, such as abdominal distention. Id. Although Simon relayed substantial
patient information to Dinter, she did not share with him any of Warren’s medical records
or test results. Id. According to Simon, her conversation with Dinter lasted less than ten
minutes. Id.
Id. at 374 (majority opinion).
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Warren’s son appealed, arguing that, in Minnesota, a duty may exist
even in the absence of a physician-patient relationship under the
foreseeability of harm standard. 107 Still, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision, holding that Dinter did not consent to either treating
Warren or being held responsible for her care. 108 The court also noted that
this case was distinct from both Skillings v. Allen and Molloy v. Meier
(Molloy II), 109 in which the foreseeability of harm standard was used to
extend a duty to a third party from an existing physician-patient
relationship. 110 Here, there was no existing relationship connecting Dinter
and Warren to create such a duty. 111 Therefore, according to the court of
appeals, Dinter had no duty to Warren. 112
C. Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision—Majority Opinion
Warren’s son appealed again, and the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts’ decisions. 113 The reason for the reversal was
twofold. First, the court determined the court of appeals had misconstrued
the holding in Skillings as requiring a contractual relationship to establish a
physician’s duty to a third party. 114 Second, the court noted that using the
foreseeability of harm standard to determine a physician’s duty, absent a
physician-patient relationship, had worked in Minnesota for one hundred
years, and there appeared to be no reason to depart from this principle. 115
The court then applied the foreseeability of harm standard to
determine whether it was foreseeable to Dinter that Warren would rely
upon and be harmed by his statements to Simon regarding Warren’s
potential hospitalization. 116 The court noted that this danger must be
“objectively reasonable to expect . . . not simply . . . within the realm of any

107

Warren v. Dinter, No. A17-0555, 2018 WL 414333, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018),

rev’d and remanded, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4 (distinguishing Molloy v. Meier (Molloy II), 679 N.W.2d 711, 713–14, 717 (Minn.
2004), and Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 325, 173 N.W. 663, 663–664 (1919)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
108
109

110
111
112
113

Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. 2019).

Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 377–78 (“[W]e must ‘apply the principles of negligence law set forth in Skillings and
Togstad and conclude that the duty arises where it is reasonably foreseeable’ that Warren
‘would be injured if the advice is negligently given.’” (quoting Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d at
114
115
116

720)).
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conceivable possibility.” 117 Using this standard, the court found it reasonable
to conclude Dinter could have foreseen that Warren would rely upon his
conversation with Simon. 118 The court also held that there was sufficient
evidence to show Dinter’s conversation with Simon constituted a breach in
the standard of care of a hospitalist, and, therefore, it was a proximate cause
of Warren’s death. 119
The court acknowledged Dinter’s and the dissent’s argument that
the conversation between Dinter and Simon was simply a curbside
consultation 120 and not a formal medical opinion by Dinter. 121 However, the
court was not persuaded by this argument, pointing to Dinter’s status as a
hospitalist and Simon’s status as a nurse practitioner 122 and noting that Simon
was asking for Warren’s admission to the hospital—not for advice on
Warren’s diagnosis. 123 As such, the court declined to address the legal status
of curbside consultations any further. 124
The court’s 5-2 holding remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 125 In doing so, the court
noted that while the subject matter of the case (the duty of a hospitalist to
another health care provider’s patient) was a question of first impression,
the underlying issue—whether summary judgment should have been granted

117
118
119

Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Foss v. Kinade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009)).
Id.
See id. (referring to expert testimony that Dinter’s statements to Simon were not consistent

with the standard of care for a hospitalist and noting that if Warren had been admitted to the
hospital as requested by Simon, she may have survived the infection).
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378.
Id. at 388 n.3. The court noted that while Simon had the authority under her collaboration
agreement with Baldwin to provide care to Warren, Simon did not have the ability to admit
Warren to the hospital. Id. This may be due to limitations on Baldwin’s scope of practice
under Minnesota law at that time, see discussion infra Section II.D., or it may be due to the
hospital’s credentialing and privileging process. See MINN. HOSP.ASS’N, MEDICAL STAFF
CREDENTIALING (2016), https://www.mnhospitals.org/Portals/0/Documents/Trustees/briefsresources/credential.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WMF-HUAL] (explaining the processes used
by health care facilities to assure that medical staff are qualified to provide health care services
and undertake only those services for which they are qualified). Credentialing and privileging
often involve the collection of information similar to that required for licensure (e.g., proof
of identity, proof of education, and a background check). This process is completed by each
facility prior to a practitioner being cleared to provided services therein. Id. Regardless,
Simon required Dinter’s sign-off to admit Warren to that particular hospital at that time.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 388 n.3.
Id. at 379.
120
121
122

123
124
125

Id.
Id. at 380.

708

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

on the issue of duty—was not. 126 According to the court, when facts related
to foreseeability (and, therefore, duty) are disputed, or there are differing
reasonable inferences from facts that are not in dispute (i.e., a “close call”),
summary judgment should be denied, and the fact finder should determine
the outcome. 127
D. Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision—Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice G. Barry Anderson spent significant
time on the concept of curbside consultations, arguing discussions between
colleagues are vital to patient care and, therefore, should have been
addressed by the majority. 128 Moreover, Justice Anderson warned that
allowing one-time conversations between health care professionals to create
a duty to a patient who is unknown to the consulting professional could have
a chilling effect on the exchange of ideas related to patient diagnosis and
treatment. 129 As such, he argued the court’s holding could be detrimental to
both patients and professionals. 130
The dissent also disagreed with the finding that Dinter should have
foreseen Warren’s reliance on, and ultimate harm from, his statements to
Simon. 131 Specifically, Justice Anderson argued that Dinter could not have
foreseen that his statements during a ten-minute phone call would prevent
Simon (who did have a duty to Warren) from taking further action to verify
her diagnosis of Warren or from finding alternative means of admitting
Warren to the hospital. 132 As part of this argument, the dissent emphasized
that Dinter did not make the final determination regarding Warren’s
treatment or hospitalization. 133 For instance, Simon sought a second opinion
from Baldwin, her collaborating physician. 134 Yet, despite other available
treatment options, 135 Simon “yield[ed] control over her patient to the
hospitalist, . . . defer[ring] to the hospitalist’s views on how to treat the
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id.
Id. at 387 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id. Baldwin testified that while it was unusual for a hospitalist to decline another

professional’s request to admit a patient, in those situations, the professional may still direct
the patient to go to the emergency room for observation. Id. The dissent used this testimony
to illustrate the idea that despite Dinter’s belief that Warren did not require hospitalization,
Simon could have taken alternative actions to assure Warren received adequate care. Id.

2020]

CASE NOTE: WARREN V. DINTER

709

patient, [and] conclud[ing] that hospital admission [was] no longer a
treatment option.” 136 This, according to Justice Anderson, was not
foreseeable behavior. 137
IV. ANALYSIS
This section begins with an overview of the utility of curbside
consultations and a discussion of how Warren may put these valuable
communications at risk. The subsequent analysis advocates for a narrow
construction of the foreseeability of harm standard in medical malpractice
cases. This is followed by a discussion of how Warren illustrates the
implications of the changing relationship between physicians and advanced
practice providers, particularly on the question of who is liable for patient
care. The section concludes with some suggestions for health care
practitioners and other professionals seeking to protect themselves from
liability in the wake of Warren.
A. Uncertainty Ahead: Creating a Duty from Curbside Consultations
This section discusses the concept of curbside consultations, or
informal consults between physicians and other health care professionals. It
first examines the utility of these communications and the differences
between curbside and formal consultations. Second, it discusses the reasons
health care professionals rely on informal discussions with colleagues when
treating patients. The section goes on to describe potential consequences of
the Warren decision when it comes to curbside consultations. Finally, it
addresses special considerations relevant to hospitalists, and why even when
a physician takes a gatekeeper role, his interactions with other professionals
should in some cases be considered informal.

1. Background on Curbside Consultations
The Warren court was clear in its holding that it did not believe it was
necessary to address the legal implications of curbside consultations. 138 That
is because, in the majority’s view, the conversation between Simon and
Dinter was not an informal discussion. 139 Still, the court noted that other
states have addressed curbside consultations between health care
professionals 140 and acknowledged that creating a duty out of these
136
137
138
139
140

Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 378 (quoting Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001)).
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conversations could limit practitioners’ willingness to engage with their
colleagues. 141 Yet, it remains unclear how Minnesota courts will treat
curbside consultations in the future.
Curbside consultations are informal conversations between
physicians (or physicians and other health care professionals) that include
an exchange of information regarding patient care. 142 These conversations
are not generally known to the patient, and no payment is made to the
consulting professional. 143 They tend to happen “opportunistically” or in
passing, rather than via a formal meeting or appointment. 144 These
interactions are distinct from formal consultations, which involve a referral
and examination of the patient by the consulting professional. 145
While formal consultations can result in a physician-patient
relationship, informal or curbside consultations do not. 146 Curbside
consultations also do not cause the consulting physician to be responsible
for the care of the patient in question. 147 This is largely because the role of
the consulting professional is indirect. 148 In a typical curbside consultation, a
conversation regarding the patient’s history, symptoms, or condition may
occur, but the consulting physician does not generally see the patient’s
records, view the patient’s test results, or examine the patient. 149

2. The Value of Curbside Consultations to Health Care Practitioners

Id. The amici curiae’s brief—jointly submitted by the Minnesota Hospital Association, the
Minnesota Medical Association, and the American Medical Association—expanded on this
point. The brief noted that “[w]hen faced with a constellation of symptoms and attempting
to formulate a diagnosis and treatment plan, physicians should be encouraged to seek out
colleagues with different experience or backgrounds to assist them in analyzing the medical
information.” Brief for Minn. Hosp. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 4, Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-0555), 2018 WL 4003503,
at *4 [hereinafter Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief]. The brief further explained that “accepting
Appellant’s argument—that a provider who offers an informal suggestion or ideas to an
independent provider about her patient now has a physician-patient relationship with that
person—would chill those important conversations and be detrimental to patient care in
Minnesota.” Id. at 6.
Cathy M. Perley, Physician Use of the Curbside Consultation to Address Information
Needs: Report on a Collective Case Study, 2 J. MED. LIBRARY ASS’N 137, 138 (2006).
Id.
141

142

143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

148

Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 5.

149

Id.
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and Patients
There are many reasons why a physician or other health care
professional may choose to engage in curbside consultations instead of
formally referring a patient to another provider. Researchers who observed
the informal consulting practices of physicians reported that physicians
engage in these conversations to:
confirm a suspected diagnosis or planned course of action (e.g.,
to “bounce ideas off their practice partners” 150);
get quick answers to questions about symptoms or treatment
options;
informally learn more about a symptom or condition from a
practitioner in a particular specialty;
explore the necessity of referring the patient for a formal
consultation;
triage patients in a particular practice setting (e.g., determining
which patients should see which providers in an emergency
room);
seek out emotional support from colleagues during difficult cases
or in advance of tough conversations with a patient or the patient’s
family;
create bonds or relationships with their colleagues;
seek out like-minded practitioners or colleagues with similar
treatment styles;
confirm their own clinical knowledge; and
investigate the appropriateness of transferring a patient to another
practitioner. 151
These observations largely track physicians’ stated reasons for
engaging in curbside consultations. 152 Physicians view curbside consultations
as a means of providing better patient care and fulfilling what they see as
professional obligations to their colleagues. 153 However, some physicians
may feel pressure to engage in curbside consultations because they are so
prevalent in the profession. 154 This leads to an occasional characterization of
curbside consultations as a “necessary evil”—a useful tool for the most part,
but one which may come with risks. 155

3. The Tenuous Future of Curbside Consultations in Minnesota

150
151
152
153
154
155

Perley, supra note 142, at 139.
Id. at 139–41.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Under Warren
The Warren decision has seemingly placed curbside consultations
on the riskier side of the balance. When paired with the foreseeability of
harm standard, it is extremely difficult to determine whether professionals
who engage in one-off discussions could be found negligent in the event a
patient is harmed. For instance, the majority opinion in Warren argued that
Dinter, as a hospitalist, should have foreseen that Simon (and, as a result,
Warren) would rely on his decision not to admit Warren. 156 It, therefore,
followed that Dinter should have foreseen Warren would be harmed if the
comments he made to Simon were negligently offered. 157 Although the court
noted that it did not intend this decision to apply to curbside consultations,
it also declined to define such discussions. 158 As such, it remains uncertain
where Minnesota courts will draw the line between what is foreseeable to a
consulting physician and what is not.
Courts in other jurisdictions have attempted to address this issue by
holding that curbside consultations do not expose a consulting physician to
potential liability. 159 For instance, in Irvin v. Smith, the Kansas Supreme
Court held that a physician providing an “informal opinion” to another
physician does not create a physician-patient relationship and does not owe
a duty to the patient. 160 The court provided several examples of informal
opinions, including a “gratuitous” conversation with a treating physician in
which some patient details were omitted, 161 an opinion in which the treating

156

Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. 2019).

Id.
Id. at 379. The majority opinion did not create a formal definition of “curbside
consultations” for health care practitioners engaging in such activities the future. See id.
157
158

However, it provided a few hints. In particular, the court seemed to characterize a curbside
consultation as an informal discussion in which a professional “pick[s] a colleague’s brain
about a diagnosis.” Id. Notably, the court did not definitively state whether it would exempt
a practitioner who engaged in the court’s vision of a curbside consultation from liability in
future cases. Id. It simply noted that other states had exempted such practitioners. Id.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l. Hosp., 600 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996)
(“A doctor who gives an informal opinion at the request of a treating physician does not owe
a duty of care to the patient whose case was discussed.”); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42,
49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that “a physician-patient relationship is created only where
the physician personally examines the patient,” while allowing for hands-off liability where a
contractual relationship between physician and patient exists); Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d
303, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (“To expose physicians . . . to liability for simply conferring
with a colleague would be detrimental in the long run to those seeking competent medical
attention and is contrary to the public policy of [Texas].”).
Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001).
Id. (citing Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 4 (Ala. 1976)).
159

160
161
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physician was told to act “as he saw fit,” 162 and a discussion in which the
consulting physician had no role in examining or treating the patient. 163
However, the Irvin court noted that an informal opinion may become
formal when the consulting physician “assumes the role of treating the
patient.” 164 In other words, when the consulting physician affirmatively acts
in a way that could be viewed as consenting to participate in the patient’s
care, the physician forms a physician-patient relationship and owes a
corresponding duty to the patient. 165 Still, the court maintained that a case in
which the consulting physician did not examine the patient, review the
patient’s records, speak to the patient, enter any patient orders, or do
anything other than speak about the patient’s condition in general terms did
not result in the physician assuming a treatment role and, therefore, the
physician did not have a duty. 166

4. The Case of the Curbside Hospitalist
While the majority in Warren did not consider the conversation
between Dinter and Simon to be a curbside consultation, the facts of the
case show that the conversation had many of the elements of this type of
informal discussion. Dinter had not met, examined, or spoken with
Warren. 167 He did not review Warren’s patient records or read her test
results. 168 Dinter’s only role in Warren’s care was hearing from Simon some
(but not all) of Warren’s symptoms over the course of a ten-minute
telephone call and offering his opinion that Warren’s symptoms indicated
uncontrolled diabetes not warranting hospitalization. 169
The majority believed Dinter’s offered opinion and denial of
admission was enough of an affirmative action to show that Dinter had
assumed a treatment role, thereby creating a duty to Warren. However, the
case was not so clear-cut. Dinter did not suggest a specific course of action
to Simon. 170 Instead, he gave his initial opinion and left it to Simon to

162
163
164

Id. (citing Hill v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)).
Id. (citing Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 306).
Id. (citing Tumblin v. Ball-Incon Glass Packaging Corp., 478 S.E.2d 81, 85 (S.C. Ct. App.

1996); Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem’l. Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 39–40 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993)).
Id. at 941–42.
Id. at 942–43.
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 381 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
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determine what additional steps to take. 171 Notably, Simon’s subsequent
action—calling Baldwin, her collaborating physician—shows that Simon did
not initially take Dinter’s opinion as an instruction. 172 Rather, Simon’s
request that Baldwin help her have Warren admitted shows Simon
understood there were other ways to get Warren the care she believed
Warren required. 173 Baldwin later confirmed that there were other potential
treatment options available to Simon, including requesting that Warren visit
an emergency room. 174 Yet, Simon—the health care practitioner who was
responsible for Warren’s care—opted not to pursue any of these options
and released Warren despite her apparent feeling that more should be
done. 175
The court held that Dinter should have foreseen Simon, having
received advice from two physicians, would, as Justice Anderson phrased it,
“fail to make reasonable treatment decisions regarding her patient.” 176
Under the majority’s view, health care practitioners must weigh the benefit
of engaging their colleagues in curbside consultations against the risk that
they may be liable for any decisions made as a result of—or in spite of—these
conversations. 177 This holding could have a chilling effect on the valuable
interactions physicians and other health care practitioners share with their
colleagues, which would, in turn, limit collaboration and teamwork in
medical settings. 178 Just as alarmingly, it could prove to be detrimental to
patient care by closing off an important source of clinical knowledge—other
health care practitioners.
B. The Foreseeability of Harm Standard Favored by Minnesota Courts

Should Be Narrowly Construed to Avoid Unintended Consequences

Several issues may arise when Minnesota’s foreseeability of harm
standard is read too broadly. Viewing the potential unintended
Id. at 383 (“Dinter’s hospitalization decision was neither determinative nor the final
answer.”).
Id. at 373.
171

172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id. at 383 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 382.
See id. at 375–80 (majority opinion).
Id. at 378 (“[Respondents], amici, and the dissent all warn that making physicians liable

for curbside consultations would harm patients by chilling beneficial interaction among
professionals. Indeed, many states exempt third-party doctors from malpractice liability
when their colleagues engage them in curbside consultations to ‘informally solicit one
another’s opinions’ regarding their patients.” (quoting Victor R. Cotton, Legal Risks of
“Curbside” Consults, 106 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 135, 135, 136 (2010))).
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consequences of an overbroad reading of this standard through the lens of
current federal laws, including the Affordable Care Act and the Medicare
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act, the resolution of these issues may
not be as simple as requiring a physician-patient relationship for a medical
malpractice action.
1. Foreseeability of Harm: Finding the Balance Between Overbroad

and Just Right

The Warren court declined to join the majority of states that require
some kind of physician-patient relationship as part of a medical malpractice
claim. 179 However, as noted in Justice Anderson’s dissent, the use of the
foreseeability of harm standard in medical malpractice cases is not generally
problematic. 180 The results are only troublesome when the concept of
foreseeability is applied too broadly. 181
For instance, the cases cited by the majority in Warren, including
Skillings, Togstad, and Molloy II, 182 all involved conversations between a
professional and a layperson (e.g., a patient’s parents or a potential legal
client). 183 Conversely, Warren involved a conversation between two health
care professionals. 184 According to Justice Anderson, it was foreseeable that
the laypeople in Skillings, Togstad, and Molloy II would rely upon any
advice they drew from their personal conversations with a professional—
whether a relationship existed or not. 185 However, it was not foreseeable that
a third party who was uninvolved in a conversation between two
professionals would similarly rely on (or even be aware of) any information
gleaned from such a discussion. 186
Justice Anderson’s dissent also noted that Simon’s actions were not
foreseeable to Dinter under Foss v. Kincade, where the court acknowledged
179
180
181
182

Id. at 377.
Id. at 386 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 376–77 (citing Molloy II, 679 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 2004) (conversation between

a physician and the patient’s parent); Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1980)
(conversation between an attorney and a potential client); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323,
324, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919) (conversation between a physician and the patient’s
parents)).
Id. at 386 (Anderson, J., dissenting).

183
184
185
186

Id.
Id.
Id. at 387. In a typical conversation between professionals, Justice Anderson notes, the

subject of the discussion is often unaware of the conversation. This is true even if the
professional seeking the advice wraps information from his or her colleague into a final
decision about the subject of the discussion.
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cases in which “the realm of possible harm is much larger than the realm of
reasonably foreseeable harm.” 187 Accordingly, “[w]hen determining whether
a danger is foreseeable, we ‘look at whether the specific danger was
objectively reasonable to expect, not simply whether it was within the realm
of any conceivable possibility.’” 188 Harms which are not “objectively
reasonable to expect” are “too remote to create liability.” 189
For instance, in the case of Foss, the court held that while the
defendants knew it was possible that their bookcase could be tipped over if
it were not secured to the wall, it was unreasonable to expect them to “make
a laundry list of common household items with which a three-year-old could
conceivably injure himself” before inviting the child and his family into their
home. 190 This is because the law does not require homeowners to “take
every precaution to guard against every possible eventuality.” 191 It is only
necessary that homeowners guard against actions that are objectively
reasonable to foresee. 192
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Warren also quotes this
passage. 193 In doing so, the majority seemingly argues that the specific
danger—that Simon would rely on Dinter’s opinions, casting off her own
judgment and forgoing further testing or efforts to hospitalize Warren even
when she believed something was very wrong with her—was “objectively
reasonable” for Dinter to expect. 194 The majority bases this argument on
Dinter’s role as a hospitalist responsible for determining whether a patient
should be admitted to the facility. 195 However, while Dinter’s decision not to
admit Warren may have foreclosed one avenue of continued treatment, it
did not require Simon to abandon all options. 196 Simon remained Warren’s
primary provider of care, and she had the authority to pursue alternative
means of care for her patient. 197 It seems unlikely that Dinter could have
foreseen his opinion—his initial “no” to hospitalization—would have

Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. 2009).
Id. at 322 (quoting Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582
N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)).
187
188

189
190
191
192

Id.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.

193

Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 378 (Minn. 2019).

194

Id.
Id.
Id. at 382 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 383.

195
196
197
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prevented Simon from trusting her clinical knowledge and ordering
additional testing or treatment. 198
That said, Warren appears to be a case in which “reasonable persons
might differ as to the foreseeability of [an] injury.” 199 The Minnesota
Supreme Court has typically held that these “close cases” are an issue for
the jury. 200 Therefore, while both the majority and the dissenting opinion
claim to have the correct view of foreseeability under Foss, the ultimate
decision regarding whether Simon’s action (or inaction) should have been
foreseeable to Dinter is left to the jury. 201 This would likely be true even if
there is no “explicit factual dispute in the record.” 202
Still, Justice Anderson’s reading of this standard appears to provide
more guidance on the issue of foreseeability of harm during a curbside
consultation than does the majority’s interpretation. When two
professionals have an informal conversation about patient care, there could
be many reasonably foreseeable outcomes. The conversation could lead to
the treating professional (in this case, Simon) asking additional questions,
ordering more tests, seeking out a formal consultation between the
consulting physician and the patient, or requesting a referral to another
provider with more experience in a certain area of medicine. However, it is
unreasonable to require the consulting professional to expect that his
opinion would cause the treating professional to suspend all other methods
of caring for her patient, as was the case in Warren. 203
198
199
200

Id.
See Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2017).
Mike Steenson, Duty, Foreseeability, and Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc., 39

MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. PUB. POL’Y. & PRAC. 31, 44 (2018).
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn.
2011)) (citing Fenrich v. Blake School, 920 N.W.2d 195, 205 (Minn. 2018); Senogles v.
Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Minn. 2017); Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629; Foss v.
Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009); Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)).
Steenson, supra note 200, at 46 (quoting Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629). Arguably,
there is a factual dispute in Warren because Simon and Dinter disagreed about the extent to
which they discussed Warren’s condition during their telephone call. Warren, 926 N.W.2d
at 373. Yet, even if there were no factual dispute, reasonable minds could differ regarding
whether Dinter should have foreseen Simon’s subsequent actions. See Steenson, supra note
200, at 46.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 383 (Anderson, J., dissenting). The court did not consider
whether Simon’s decision to send Warren home, despite the existence and availability of
other treatment options, constituted an intervening or superseding cause of Warren’s death.
It is likely that the majority in Warren believed Simon’s actions should have been foreseeable
to Dinter, and, therefore, even if this was an intervening cause, the court would have found
that it could not be a superseding cause. See Steenson, supra note 200, at 38. Minnesota’s
jury instruction echoes this idea by requiring a superseding cause to meet four requirements:
201

202

203
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2. Potential Unintended Consequences of an Overbroad
Foreseeability of Harm Standard
It is important that courts do not create unintended consequences
for health care professionals who engage in clinical discussions with their
colleagues by using an overbroad interpretation of foreseeability of harm.
Health care practices, systems, facilities, and payors are increasingly
encouraging—and even incentivizing—collaboration among health care
professionals. 204 These policies tend to have two goals: limiting health care
costs and improving quality of care.

a. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act, signed into law in 2010, created a Medicare
Shared Savings Program, which incentivized the use of Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs) 205 and Patient-Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs). 206
(1) it occurred after the original act of negligence; (2) it did not occur due to the original
negligent act; (3) it altered the “natural course of events by making the result different from
what it would have been;” and (4) the original negligent party could not have reasonably
anticipated the action. 4 MINN. PRAC., JURY INSTR. GUIDES—CIVIL CIVJIG 27.20 (6th ed.
2014). Even if the court believed that Simon’s action was an intervening or superseding cause,
the result may be the same for Dinter, as the court has held that superseding causes are
“adequately taken into consideration in the comparative-fault formula.” Montemayor, 898
N.W.2d at 631 (quoting Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 625 (1984)).
Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law,
Policy, and Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 467 (2013).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2018)); see also Mark T. Morrell & Alex T. Krouse,
Accountability Partners: Legislated Collaboration for Health Reform, 11 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 225, 244 (2014). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) defines
ACOs as:
[G]roups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, who come together
voluntarily to give coordinated high-quality care to their Medicare patients. The goal of
coordinated care is to ensure that patients get the right care at the right time, while avoiding
unnecessary duplication of services and avoiding medical errors. When an ACO succeeds
both in delivering high-quality care and spending health care dollars more wisely, the ACO
will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare program.
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct.
2,
2019),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/
[https://perma.cc/MER5-G9N9].
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3502(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 256a-1 (2018)); see also Mantel, supra note 204, at 247–48. The U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), defines PCMHs as a model of primary care delivery which includes five key
features: (1) comprehensive patient care, including preventive, acute, and chronic care,
delivered by a team of practitioners that include physicians, nurse practitioners, physician
204

205

206
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ACOs are health care entities that consist of teams of providers who are
accountable to both patients and each other in streamlining and
coordinating patient care. 207 ACOs are performance-driven, and they receive
shared financial incentives when they improve patient outcomes (e.g., by
limiting hospital admissions) while meeting cost and quality measures. 208
Similarly, PCMHs use health care provider teams to offer primary care
services that are “accessible, continuous, comprehensive, family-centered,
coordinated, compassionate, and culturally effective.” 209
The success or failure of these models largely depends on providers’
ability to communicate with one another about patient care. Effective use of
ACOs and PCMHs—both of which are intended to improve patient care
outcomes and help reduce health care spending 210—would be nearly
impossible to implement and manage if health care providers feared they
could be held liable for even the most cursory conversation about the care
of a participating patient.

assistants, and other health care professionals; (2) patient-centered focus, which includes the
patient’s individual health as well as his or her “unique needs, culture, values, and
preferences;” (3) coordination of care, through which the “medical home” serves as the
patient’s primary provider which brings in additional specialists when necessary; (4)
accessibility of care, including reduced wait times, increased service hours, immediate
appointments for urgent issues, and 24-hour services via telecommunications; and (5)
improved quality and safety, with an emphasis on shared decision-making between health
care providers, patients, and families and improved data collection and measurement.
Defining the PCMH, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
https://pcmh.ahrq.gov/page/defining-pcmh
[https://perma.cc/RZ9B-BU36] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
Morrell & Krouse, supra note 205, at 244.
207

Id.
Id. at 247 (quoting Melinda K. Abrams et al., Can Patient-Centered Medical Homes
Transform Health Care Delivery?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 27, 2009),
208
209

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/other-publication/2009/mar/can-patientcentered-medical-homes-transform-health-care [https://perma.cc/E8F6-F7KA]).
Id. at 244, 248. The Affordable Care Act included many other provisions that are meant
to incentivize collaboration among health care providers, including increased funding for
community health centers, which focus on outreach to underserved communities. Id. at 256,
288. The authors also note that the Affordable Care Act’s goal of insuring more individuals
means that demand for health care services will increase. See id. at 287. This will require an
all-hands-on-deck approach where physicians and non-physician providers like nurse
practitioners and physician assistants work together to assure those who need care are able
to receive it. See id.
210
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b. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act
In 2015, Congress passed legislation that created new, “value-based”
payment models for the federal Medicare program. 211 These models are
meant to improve quality, outcomes, and cost-effectiveness rather than
simply paying providers on a per-visit, per-procedure basis. 212 A key
component of value-based payment for health care services is the
streamlining of patient care, particularly for patients with multiple or
complex health conditions. 213 The average Medicare beneficiary visits two
primary care providers and five specialty care providers each year, plus
additional health professionals who offer diagnostic services—such as
imaging and bloodwork—and pharmacy services. 214 However, Medicare
beneficiaries with chronic or complex conditions may require exponentially
more visits and increasingly specialized providers. 215 These patients, in
particular, can benefit from modernized payment models which allow teams
of providers to work together to treat the patient in an efficient manner. 216
Research supports the implementation of policies that increase the
use of value-based, team-provided health care for Medicare beneficiaries. 217
Moreover, health care practices using these care models have shown
increased clinician productivity. 218 However, Warren raises questions about
how far “foreseeability” will travel in a practice that emphasizes team-based
care. Would a conversation between a primary care provider and a specialty
provider about a patient create a duty in the consulting physician? If the
provider who asked the question subsequently opted not to continue care,
would the provider who answered it be responsible? The implications of
the Warren decision could be far-reaching.

3. Formal Physician-Patient Relationships: A Solution? Not So Fast
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 101(c)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2018)).
See Quality Payment Program Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://qpp.cms.gov/about/qpp-overview [https://perma.cc/52UH-BAJ2] (last visited Sept.
23, 2019); MIPS Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/overview [https://perma.cc/3M8C-MVPH] (last visited Sept. 23,
2019).
Cynthia D. Smith et al., Implementing Optimal Team-Based Care to Reduce Clinician
Burnout, NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. (Sept. 17, 2018), https://nam.edu/implementing-optimalteam-based-care-to-reduce-clinician-burnout/ [https://perma.cc/P2VP-LN2P].
211

212

213

214
215
216
217
218

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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...
Many states have intentionally or unintentionally foreclosed the issue
of an overbroad application of foreseeability in medical malpractice cases
by requiring the existence of a physician-patient relationship, 219 direct patient
contact, 220 or other expressions of consent by the consulting physician to be
clinically responsible for the patient’s care 221 before a duty is created.
However, as a handful of courts have noted, the changing nature of health
care—particularly, the emphasis on team-based care—has further
complicated determinations about the existence of a true physician-patient
relationship. 222
While federal interest in reducing health care spending bears
significant responsibility for this shift, other factors in the health care
marketplace have contributed as well. Although small, physician-owned
practices once dominated the U.S. health care system, reforms meant to
increase efficiency and lower health care costs have led to an increase in
large-group- or hospital-owned health care conglomerates. 223 Gone are the
days of physicians opening their own solo practices. 224 In fact, the percentage
of physicians who are in private practice has decreased from over 72% in
1988 to just under 46% in 2018. 225
As a result, today’s physicians have been thrust into practice settings
where they are surrounded by a large number of colleagues, and they are
expected to deliver health care services seamlessly, as a team. 226 In these
environments, it may be difficult to ascertain who has a physician-patient
relationship with a patient and who does not.
Arguably, in these settings, Minnesota’s “foreseeability of harm”
standard may be more effective in establishing whether a health care
219
220

See, e.g., Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001).
See generally Blake, supra note 42, at 589–93 (discussing cases where a duty was imposed

from direct patient contact as an alternative to the traditional physician-patient requirement).
Baird, supra note 40, at 191.
See, e.g., Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 910 (Or. 2012); Kelley v. Middle
Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Tenn. 2004).
Mantel, supra note 204, at 461–63.
Stephen L. Isaacs et al., The Independent Physician — Going, Going . . ., 360 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 655, 655–57 (2009).
Tanya Henry, Employed Physicians Now Exceed Those Who Own Their Own Practices,
AM. MED. ASS’N (May 10, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/about/research/employedphysicians-now-exceed-those-who-own-their-practices [https://perma.cc/A35T-MFH6]. The
number of employed physicians was higher than the number of physicians in private practice
for the first time in 2018. Id. However, the total percentage of physicians practicing in fully
physician-owned settings was 54%. Id.
Mantel, supra note 204, at 463.
221
222

223
224

225

226
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provider has a duty to a patient than the more common physician-patient
relationship standard. However, to prevent unintended consequences,
foreseeability must be narrowly construed. Justice Anderson’s approach in
Warren seems to strike the proper balance by focusing on the foreseeability
of the “specific danger,” as illustrated in Foss. 227 This standard would benefit
both patients 228 and health care professionals while continuing to encourage
a professional exchange of ideas through collaboration.
C. Warren Illustrates the Legal and Policy Implications of the Evolving

Role of Advanced Practice Providers

Warren illustrates legal and policy questions surrounding the increased
practice authority of advanced practice providers. This section considers
physicians’ legal responsibility from collaborating with or supervising nurse
practitioners and physician assistants. Additionally, it discusses the
responsibility of physicians who practice alongside advanced practice
providers with whom they do not have a legal collaborative or supervisory
relationship.
1. The Argument for Limiting Physician Responsibility for Advanced
Practice Providers
The Warren decision illustrates what is likely to become a more
common question as advanced practice providers continue to grow in
number and authority: to what degree, if any, should physicians be held
responsible for care provided by a nurse practitioner or physician assistant?
In Warren, the court ultimately held that Dinter, who had neither seen
Simon’s patient nor reviewed the patient’s records, could nonetheless be
liable for the patient’s death. 229 This was true even though Simon could have
taken other actions concerning Warren’s condition to assure Warren
Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009) (quoting Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn.1998)).
Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 5. (“Patients ultimately benefit from . . .
informal discussions and brainstorming sessions among providers by receiving improved
care.”) The brief goes on to state:
Discouraging these informal discussions by assigning liability to providers who offer input
and suggestions on an informal basis would only serve to harm patients. The better position
is one recognized and adopted by the Court of Appeals, where a physician providing an
informal consultation to an independent treating provider does not assume a physicianpatient relationship with that patient. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the majority of
other states who have considered this policy issue, and would stifle and discourage the robust
practice of medicine in Minnesota to the detriment of patient care.
Id. at 8.
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. 2019).
227

228

229
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received appropriate care despite Dinter’s refusal to admit her. 230 For
instance, Simon could have ordered further testing or directed Warren to
seek emergency room care, but she declined to do so. 231 This result has
correctly caused physicians to fear the extent to which they can be held
responsible for care provided by another practitioner. 232
As nurse practitioners and physician assistants gain more autonomy,
their relationship with physicians will continue to change. This is particularly
true in the case of nurse practitioners, who have completely severed their
legal ties to physicians in states like Minnesota that have enacted full practice
authority legislation. 233 While Warren came at a time of change for the
advanced practice nursing profession, nurse practitioners in Minnesota are
now considered to be autonomous. 234 As noted in the Minnesota Hospital
Association’s amici curiae brief supporting Dinter, holding a physician
responsible for the autonomous act of a nurse practitioner after the
enactment of full practice authority legislation violates the spirit of this
change. 235
That said, there is a compelling argument for limiting physicians’
responsibility for care provided by advanced practice providers, like
physician assistants, who do not currently have full practice authority in
Minnesota. 236 Simon’s collaborative relationship with Baldwin at the time of
the events leading to Warren’s death was similar to that of a physician
assistant and supervising physician today, in which physician assistants have
a legal tie to their supervising physician. 237 This is accomplished by stating
that the physician is “responsible” for the health care services rendered by
the provider. 238
However, this provision does not mean that the supervising or
collaborating physician is solely responsible for the care provided by the
advanced practice provider. 239 Rather, physician assistants who practice
under a supervisory agreement with a physician remain liable for their own

230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id. at 382–83 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 382.
Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 2–3.
Id. at 10–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 147A.01, subdiv. 24 (2019) (providing that, in Minnesota, a supervising

physician “oversee[s] the activities of, and accept[s] responsibility for, the medical services
rendered by a physician assistant”).
238

Id.

239

Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 13.
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actions and omissions. 240 Holding physicians responsible for the
autonomous decisions of advanced practice providers is counterproductive
and may expose physicians to unnecessary liability. 241

2. The Potential Effects of Warren on Physicians and Advanced
Practice Providers Who Are Not in a Legal Collaborative
Relationship
In Warren, the court held that Dinter, a physician with no legal tie to
Simon, was nonetheless legally responsible for Simon’s patient. 242 The court
used Dinter’s role as a hospitalist to cast him as a “gatekeeper” who should
have foreseen that his refusal to admit Warren, if negligent, would cause her
harm. 243 This holding could cause physicians who provide any kind of
guidance, advice, or one-off instruction to be held liable for independent
decisions made by an advanced practice provider. 244 This potential result
would be devastating to the delivery of health care, both in Minnesota and
in states that find Warren to be persuasive. Advanced practice providers
who are supervised by, or collaborate with, physicians typically enter into a
written practice agreement that affirms the relationship, defines the roles
and duties of each party, and sets forth the terms and expectations related
to supervision or collaboration. 245 Physicians and advanced practice
providers willingly enter into these agreements, with each party
understanding its roles and responsibilities therein. 246
However, if physicians who have not chosen to enter a specific
supervisory or collaborative agreement with an advanced practice provider
run the risk of being liable for the care provided by those providers, these
physicians may begin refusing, even incidentally, to work alongside them. 247
This, in turn, would lead physicians to refer advanced practice providers
240
241

Id.
Id. at 8, 13.

242

Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 379–80 (Minn. 2019).

243

Id. at 380.

Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 13.
See MINN. STAT. § 147A.01, subdiv. 17a (2019) (requiring physician assistants to enter
into a “delegation agreement” with a supervising physician). The delegation or practice
agreement must set forth the physician assistant’s scope of practice, including the physician
assistant’s role in patient care and the categories of medications and medical devices that the
physician may prescribe. Id. The agreement must also describe the method of supervision.
Id. Supervision does not require the physician’s constant physical presence, but the physician
assistant and supervising physician must be able to be easily contacted via
telecommunication. Id. subdiv. 24.
Minn. Hosp. Ass’n Brief, supra note 141, at 13.
Id. at 14.
244
245

246
247
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back to their supervising or collaborating physicians rather than engaging in
collaborative discussion. 248 In cases where time is of the essence, a delay
caused by fear of liability could mean the difference between life and death.
D. How Can Health Care Practitioners Protect Themselves from Liability

Post-Warren?

The Warren decision raises concerns among many in the health care
community—in Minnesota and elsewhere. 249 In the wake of this holding,
physicians and other health care practitioners should be mindful of the
potential liability they could incur by collaborating too closely on patient
care. What follows are some courses of action that health care providers
(and other professionals) can take to limit their risk post-Warren,
categorized based on the role of the consulting practitioner.

1. For Gatekeepers
Practitioners who are in a “gatekeeper” role, similar to Dinter’s role
as a hospitalist, are most likely to be at risk due to the Warren decision. 250
Justice Anderson’s dissent suggests that hospitalists who fear liability of the
kind assigned to Dinter must “refuse to take calls from other professionals
to discuss potential hospitalization of those professionals’ patients.” 251

Id.
See, e.g., Christopher Johnson, How a Minnesota Supreme Court Decision Could Affect
Curbside
Consults,
KEVINMD.COM
(May
16,
2019),

248
249

https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2019/05/how-a-minnesota-supreme-court-decision-couldaffect-curbside-consults.html [https://perma.cc/YSJ9-4AAP] (arguing that the court’s use of
foreseeability of harm is “chilling” because a consulting physician may not have been
provided all of the relevant patient details, particularly if the patient’s condition relates to a
different field of medicine); MN Supreme Court Rules Physician-Patient Relationship Is Not
Necessary to Sue Docs for Malpractice, MINN. MED. ASS’N (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.mnmed.org/news-and-publications/News/MN-Supreme-Court-Rules-PhysicianPatient-Relations [https://perma.cc/K98K-FM62] (stressing that the decision may hinder
physicians’ ability to collaborate with colleagues and quoting the General Counsel of the
association-endorsed medical liability insurer, COPIC, in stating that the “expansive
language” in the decision “raise[s] concerns”); MN Supreme Court: Warren v. Dinter, MINN.
MED. GRP. MGMT. ASS’N (June 26, 2019), https://www.mmgma.org/news/458203/MNSupreme-Court-Warren-v.-Dinter.htm [https://perma.cc/T3UH-2ZWD] (reporting that the
decision raises concerns for physicians and that the Minnesota Medical Association and the
Minnesota Hospital Association have created task forces to study the issue).
See Ryan C. Ellis, Warren v. Dinter Case, GISLASON & HUNTER LLP: INSIGHTS (Apr. 24,
2019), https://www.gislason.com/warren-v-dinter-case/ [https://perma.cc/EMS3-4D58].
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 386 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Warren v. Dinter, No. A17-0555, 2018 WL 414333, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018)).
250

251
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However, such an overcorrection would certainly harm patients. 252 Instead,
these practitioners should operate under the assumption that if they provide
any kind of advice, guidance, or commentary about a patient to a colleague,
that colleague will rely upon the advice. 253 Hospitalists must also assume they
have a duty to their colleagues’ patients because it is foreseeable that if their
advice is negligently given, a patient could be harmed. 254

2. For Other Collaborators
Other, non-gatekeeper practitioners should also exercise caution. 255
When a colleague asks for an opinion about treating a patient who is
unknown to the consulting practitioner, the consulting practitioner should
make sure to understand as many details of the patient’s condition and
history as possible, especially if the consulting practitioner believes the
advice will strongly weigh on the colleague’s course of action. 256
However, increasing the consulting practitioner’s knowledge about the
patient (e.g., by sharing test results or patient records) could constitute the
tipping point between a curbside consultation and a consultation viewed as
more formal by the court. 257 Consulting practitioners should, therefore, have

See id. (stating that the decision in Warren “is unlikely to serve Minnesotans well,
particularly those who may have access to primary health care but lack access to a deep
network of medical specialists”).
Ellis, supra note 250.
252

253
254

Id.

Some commentators have written that the holding in Warren is unlikely to affect true
curbside consultations. See id. Instead, it is argued that this decision will have the greatest
effect on cases that involve a practitioner in a gatekeeper role. Id. (stating that a “gatekeeper”
practitioner should assume, in the aftermath of Warren, that their “advice and guidance will
be relied upon.”) However, it has also been noted that the lack of guidance by the court
regarding the definition of “curbside consultation” has resulted in uncertainty about where
the line will be drawn between foreseeable and not foreseeable. Id.
See id. (“If, however, a healthcare provider is asked to opine regarding a course of
treatment for a patient that is unknown to them, they ought to exercise caution about the
advice they provide to their colleagues and make sure they understand the nature and extent
of the medical issue because the advice and guidance they provide may ultimately be
determinative.”).
Thaddeus Pope, Curbside Consults: New Liability Risks to Avoid When You Are Not a
Patient’s Physician, ASCO POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.ascopost.com/issues/june-252019/new-liability-risks-to-avoid-when-you-are-not-a-patient-s-physician/
[https://perma.cc/ZMA5-36XN]. An informal, curbside consultation usually has several key
features: (1) it involves brief, non-specific information, without much detail; (2) it does not
involve direct patient interaction (in person or otherwise); (3) it does not involve the
consulting physician’s review of the patient’s record or participation in formulating the
patient’s care plan; (4) it results in the offering of mostly academic advice; and (5) it is not
255

256

257
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a “low threshold” for recommending a formal patient consultation, whether
with themselves or another professional. 258 When in doubt, practitioners
should step back from an informal discussion and recommend a more
formal consult. 259

3. For All Consulting Practitioners
Some recommendations stemming from the Warren decision apply
to health care practitioners in any situation. First and foremost, practitioners
should understand the laws of the jurisdiction in which they practice. 260 If
there is still a lack of clarity (and post-Warren, this will likely be the case),
practitioners should look to the policies set by their employers (e.g.,
hospitals or medical groups) or their liability insurance carriers. 261
Practitioners should also use Warren as a reminder that, in Minnesota, a
duty may exist to a patient even if a traditional physician-patient relationship
has not been created. This means that any type of communication about a
patient, whether in person, via email, in a phone call, or through any other
means, could create such a duty, depending on the situation. 262
Additionally, practitioners should keep detailed records of any
consultations they provide to their colleagues—curbside or otherwise. 263
Warren involved conflicting accounts of what information Simon had
provided to Dinter and exactly what Dinter had recommended (or not
recommended). 264 Record-keeping on both sides could help resolve any
questions regarding the nature and extent of a conversation between
professionals.
Finally, practitioners should consult with their professional
associations for assistance in navigating the Warren decision. For example,
the Minnesota Medical Association has released initial suggestions for
Minnesota physicians, focusing on how to avoid liability due to curbside

billed by the consulting practitioner. Id. However, if even one of these attributes is missing,
the interaction runs the risk of becoming a formal consultation. Id.
Ellis, supra note 250.
Pope, supra note 257.
Brianne Goodwin, Not Your Patient? You Can Still Be Sued for Malpractice, UROLOGY
TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.urologytimes.com/malpractice-consult/not-your-patientyou-can-still-be-sued-malpractice/page/0/1 [https://perma.cc/29SD-YKE4].
258
259
260

261
262
263
264

See id.
Ellis, supra note 250.
See id.
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Minn. 2019).
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consultations. 265 While these forms of guidance do not constitute legal
advice, they can be useful in establishing best practices.

4. For Professionals Outside Health Care
In his dissent, Justice Anderson cautioned that the Warren decision
could have effects that reach into professions beyond health care. 266
Curbside consultations are not unique to medicine; in fact, they are
frequently used by lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to get an
informal second opinion on a matter involving a client. 267 As was the case in
Warren, the clients of these consulting professionals are generally unaware
of these professional-to-professional conversations. 268 Yet, under this
decision, it is possible that these professionals could also unwittingly create
a duty to a client when a colleague consults them. 269
As a result, professionals outside health care should also use caution
when engaging in informal, curbside discussions. 270 In particular, the
Minnesota Medical Association’s advice—to clearly state when a
conversation is informal, keep informal conversations brief and limited in
scope, and recommend formal consultations when appropriate 271—likely
translates well to other professionals who find themselves in situations
similar to Dinter’s. Additionally, other professionals would be well-served
to keep detailed notes of any informal consultations in which they choose
to participate.
V. CONCLUSION

Warren considered whether a conversation between a treating nurse
practitioner and a consulting physician was enough to create a duty to the
MINN. MED. ASS’N, MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT UPDATE: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ALERT
(2019),
https://www.mnmed.org/MMA/media/HiddenDocuments/MedicalMalpracticeAlert.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VP7-EFV9]. The Minnesota
Medical Association’s guidance to physicians includes: (1) only providing advice if there is
enough information to support a conclusion; (2) expecting non-physician providers to be
more reliant on advice than other physicians; (3) keeping curbside consultations brief and
general; (4) recommending formal consultations when appropriate; (5) seeking changes to
internal facility or practice policies regarding the line between formal and informal
consultations; (6) avoiding “defensive medicine” that can compromise patient care and lead
to more, rather than less, liability; and (7) being clear during consultations about whether the
discussion is formal or informal. Id.
Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 386 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387.
265

266
267
268
269
270
271

Id.
Id.
MINN. MED. ASS’N, supra note 265.
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patient in the physician. The court applied an established foreseeability of
harm standard and concluded that the consulting physician should have
foreseen that the nurse practitioner’s patient would rely on the content of
this conversation and be harmed if the physician negligently provided any
advice. The court declined to address the legal status of one-time curbside
consultations between health care professionals.
The decision in Warren could have the unintended consequence of
impeding collaboration between colleagues in health care settings and,
ultimately, negatively impact patient care. The decision has also created
uncertainty among health care providers and professionals outside of health
care alike. Therefore, professionals should take precautionary measures to
appropriately reduce liability and consult with their employing entities and
professional associations for further guidance.
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